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Previous studies have identified a negative potential in the event-
related potential (ERP), the error-related negativity (ERN), which is
claimed to be triggered by a deviation from a reward expectation.
Furthermore, this negativity is related to shifts in risk taking,
strategic behavioral adjustments, and inhibition. We used a com-
puter Blackjack gambling task to further examine the process
associated with the ERN. Our findings are in line with the view that
the ERN process is related to the degree of reward expectation.
Furthermore, increased ERN amplitude is associated with the
negative evaluation of ongoing decisions, and the amplitude of
the ERN is directly related to risk-taking and decision-making
behavior. However, the findings suggest that an explanation
exclusively based on the deviation from a reward expectation
may be insufficient and that the intention of the participants and the
importance of a negative event for learning and behavioral change
are crucial to the understanding of ERN phenomena.
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Introduction
In the early 1990s, Falkenstein and others (1991) and Gehring
and others (1993) independently described a negative de-
ﬂection in the event-related potential response to errors in
reaction time tasks. This so called ‘‘error-related negativity’’
(ERN, Gehring and others 1993) or ‘‘error negativity’’ (Falken-
stein and others 1991) is characterized by a negative peak
deﬂection that becomes maximal around 80 ms after the re-
sponse. According to electromyography (EMG) recordings, it
starts at the time of response initiation. For this reason, this ERN
is referred to as the ‘‘response-locked ERN.’’
The association of the response-locked ERN with remedial
actions was described by Gehring and others (1993). In this
study, larger ERNs were related to a decrease in error force
(possibly the attempt of an inhibition of the erroneous re-
sponse), an increase in likelihood of error corrections, and
slower responses on the following trial. The slowing in sub-
sequent trials suggests some kind of adaptation for future
events, which reﬂects general inhibition or a strategic change
in behavior. In another study by Scheffers and others (1996), the
ERN was also present after errors in a NoGo task (commis-
sion errors/unsuccessful inhibition of a response), in which no
active error correction was possible. This may suggest that
remedial action is not the only function of the ERN process and
that the remedial effects of the ERN process may be inhibitory.
Further studies by Miltner and others (1997) and others (Mars
and others 2004; Nieuwenhuis and others 2005) suggested that
an ERN, the ‘‘feedback ERN’’, might also be elicited by negative
performance feedback (peaking at about 250 ms, Holroyd and
Coles 2002). Recently, Gehring and Willoughby (2002) used a
gambling paradigm and described a negative deﬂection in
the ERP with a peak at 265 ms, which they termed ‘‘medial
frontal negativity’’ (MFN). This negative deﬂection was elicited
by negative feedback (the loss of money) as compared with
positive feedback (the gain of money), when the choice of
the participant did not predict the outcome. According to
Gehring and Willoughby (2002), the MFN may represent a
different component than the ERN. However, in a subse-
quent replication of the Gehring and Willoughby (2002) study,
Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, and others (2004) found that the MFN
following utilitarian feedback of losses is similar to the ERN to
performance feedback. The salience of the feedback determines
which factor primarily elicits the ERN. Thus, the subjective
importance of each kind of feedback seems to be relevant for
ERN generation.
In another recent study, Holroyd, Larsen, and others (2004)
described a pseudo trial-and-error learning task with monetary
incentives. The relative outcome of the trial in relation to
different possible outcomes (e.g., 0 vs. 2.5 or 5 cent gain) mainly
determined the amplitude of the ERN rather than the absolute
outcome (gain or loss of money). For example, a win of 2.5 cents
may be considered as negative relative to a win of 5 cents but
positive relative to no win at all. The ﬁndings of Holroyd, Larsen,
and others (2004) indicate that the ERN is not sensitive to the
absolute utilitarian value of the feedback. Thus, these results
corroborate the view that the relative or subjective relevance of
the feedback moderates the amplitude of the ERN (for a similar
ﬁnding on subjective importance, see Yeung and others 2005).
In another study, Holroyd and others (2003) showed that the
same omission of a reward of 5 cents elicited a larger ERN in an
experimental condition where losses were infrequent rather
than frequent. They argued that a stronger deviation from the
expectation of the mean reward in the infrequent condition
might have been responsible for the larger ERN. In summary, the
above ﬁndings are compatible with the idea that a negative
deviation from a reward expectation results in an ERN (for
a more detailed discussion, see Holroyd and Coles 2002).
In several recent publications, Holroyd and others (Holroyd
and Coles 2002; Holroyd, Coles, and others 2002; Holroyd and
others 2003; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, and others 2004; Holroyd
and others 2005) have argued that the different negativities in
response to errors and negative feedback are related to a neural
mechanism of reinforcement learning (RL). According to RL
theory, the basal ganglia continuously evaluate the outcome of
ongoing behaviors or internal and external events against
participants’ expectations. If the outcome of an event is better
than expected, there is an increase in phasic activity of midbrain
dopaminergic neurons, whereas a decrease in activity of these
neurons is induced if the event turns out to be worse than
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expected. These processes are closely linked to the detection of
negative temporal difference (TD) errors according to mathe-
matical formulations of learning theory (e.g., Sutton and Barto
1981). Such negative time difference errors indicate the decline
of goal or reward expectancy. The decrease of dopaminergic
activity as a function of violated expectancy is subsequently
conveyed to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the frontal
cortex where apical dendrites of motor neurons become dis-
inhibited and the ERN is generated. Several studies conﬁrm the
idea that the ERN is generated in the ACC and in nearby medial
frontal cortical areas (Dehaene and others 1994; Miltner and
others 1997; Carter and others 1998; Holroyd and others 1998;
Gehring and others 2000; Kiehl and others 2000; Miltner and
others 2003; Holroyd and others 2004; Ullsperger and von
Cramon 2001; but see Nieuwenhuis and others 2005).
In a recent study, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) reported on
a gambling task where participants had to decide between large
and small amounts of money that turned out to be either wins or
losses. They reported on differences in risk-taking behavior
after monetary losses, which correlated with feedback ERN
amplitude. In particular, participants who showed greater ERNs
to losses (small and large) yielded stronger shifts toward risk-
taking behavior than participants with smaller ERN amplitudes.
The latter ﬁnding might suggest a role for the ERN in strategic
adjustments of behavior and decision making. In another study,
Yasuda and others (2004) also described associations between
ERN amplitude and shifts in risk-taking behavior in a card-
guessing paradigm. It is important to note that feedback in the
latter studies was given pseudorandomly. Thus, shifts in risk-
taking behavior did not have any consequences for the out-
come. However, a direct RL theory prediction of behavioral
changes is based on the idea that feedback is contingent upon
behavior. In such a context, increased ERN amplitudes associ-
ated with one speciﬁc decision or behavior should lead to
avoidance of this decision or behavior in the future.
The present study was designed to explore RL theory in the
context of a realistic gambling paradigm, in which measures of
the ERN were derived for various task events. It was hypothe-
sized that a decline in reward or goal expectancy would be
positively related to the ERN amplitude. In particular, the
ERN amplitude to feedback indicating a loss should be larger
in situations with stronger rather than weaker reward expec-
tancy. In other words, more unexpected negative outcomes
should result in greater ERN activity. Furthermore, we hypoth-
esized that interindividual differences in the ERN amplitude
would be related to interindividual differences in risk-taking or
decision-making behavior during the gambling task. In partic-
ular, we expected that participants who showed greater
feedback or response-locked ERN amplitudes to a negative
outcome resulting from a decision would avoid repeating
similar decisions across the experiment.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the student population of the Friedrich
Schiller Universita¨t. A total of 18 right-handed participants took part in
the experiment (16 females; mean age: 20.89 years, standard deviation
[SD] = ±2.4 years, range 18--26 years). All were paid 6 Euro per hour for
participation plus an extra bonus that varied between 0 and 8.60 EUR
according to the participant’s performance in a German version of the
Blackjack gambling task.
Procedure
Prior to the experiment, participants were informed that the purpose of
the experiment was to investigate brain waves during gambling. After
receiving verbal instruction about the basic rules of the game, and after
performing 25 practice trials, participants gave written consent for
participation in the experiment.
The game consisted of a German version of ‘‘Blackjack’’ called
‘‘Seventeen and Four.’’ The game is usually played with the following
cards of each suit (points of each card are presented in brackets): Ace
(11), King (4), Queen (3), Jack (2), Ten (10), Nine (9), Eight (8), and
Seven (7). To make the symbols of the different cards comparable, a new
type of card displaying 11 small symbols of the card’s suit replaced the
Ace. Similarly, the King was replaced by a Four, the Queen by a Three,
and the Jack by a Two. The total card set thus was composed of the
following cards: 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. As in Blackjack, the goal of the
game was to get 21 points or to approach 21 points as closely as possible
by successively drawing single cards from the bank but to avoid getting
over 21 points. In the present experiment, a computer simulated the
opponent. Each game started with the simultaneous presentation of
2 cards for the player and 2 cards for the opponent with the value of
the starting points of each pair of cards varying between 11 and 21.
Furthermore, these values were balanced between player and opponent
across the experiment. The cards of the player were depicted with the
front side up on the left side of the horizontal midline of a video screen
positioned in front of the participant, and cards of the opponent were
presented with the backside up at a small distance above the cards of the
player (see Fig. 1). After this opening, players were presented with
a third card to the right of the ﬁrst 2 cards with face down. Immediately
after card presentation, participants were prompted by a tone to either
accept (hit) or reject (stay) this card. The maximum time for par-
ticipant’s decision was 1000 ms. If the participant chose a hit, the card’s
back side turned green, and then the front side of the chosen card was
displayed. Then, the next card was offered, again with face down, and
the participant was prompted acoustically to either accept or reject this
new card. If the participant rejected this next card (or if card points had
already exceeded 21 points) the backside of this card turned red. Then
the game continued with the opponent’s turn. The strategy of the
opponent was set to hit always at 14 or lower points and to stay
whenever the sum of the cards was 15 or higher. At the end of the trial,
the hand of the opponent was shown on the screen by turning all of the
opponent’s cards from the back to its front sides. At the same time,
feedback was given to the player indicating whether he/she had won or
lost on the trial by presenting the words ‘‘won’’ (‘‘gewonnen’’) or ‘‘lost’’
(‘‘verloren’’) on the screen. Finally, the next trial started 2300 ms after
feedback presentation by showing the initial cards for the next game
trial. For further information about the exact timing of card presenta-
tions, the succession of cards, and participant’s response deadline see
Figure 2.
The experiment consisted of 440 single game trials. According to the
strategy played, participants received an average bonus of 2.76 € (SD =
±2.1) for successful trials. After the ﬁrst part of the experiment,
participants were invited to participate in a second experiment where
they observed someone else playing a similar card game. Results of this
part of the experiment will be presented elsewhere.
Behavioral data were analyzed using item response models (see
below) and behavioral changes were parameterized. The number of
changes in decision-making behavior after a loss from sit to hit and vice
versa were separately counted for each speciﬁc score (e.g., 15 points).
These data were aggregated for correlation analyses with ERN activity
across scores between 15 and 20 in order to provide 2 estimates of
behavioral changes: 1) changes toward higher risk (sit to hit) after losses
with a sit decision and 2) changes toward lower risk (hit to sit) after
losses with a hit decision.
Electroencephalography (EEG) Recording and Quantiﬁcation
Participants were seated individually in an electrically shielded, dimly lit
EEG cabin and electrodes were applied for the measurement of
electrooculogram (EOG) and EEG. EEG was recorded from 61 electrode
sites. Montage of electrodes was realized by the Easy-Cap electrode
system (Falk Minow Services, Munich, Germany) and included all
electrodes according to the 10--10 system plus both earlobes (A1, A2).
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The remaining electrodes were interspaced at equal distances between
these electrodes. All sites were referenced to the vertex (Cz). A bipolar
horizontal EOG was recorded from the epicanthus of each eye, and
a bipolar vertical EOG was recorded from supra- and infraorbital
positions of the left eye. The EEG and the EOG were recorded with
Ag/AgCl electrodes. All electrode sites were cleaned with alcohol and
gently abraded prior to electrode ﬁxation in order to keep the
impedances of electrodes below 5 kOhm, and the differences in
impedance between homologous sites below 1 kOhm. EEG and EOG
were ampliﬁed with a 64 channel AC ampliﬁer (input impedance: 10
MOhm). Band-pass was set to 0.05--100 Hz (–12 dB/octave roll-off); the
signals were digitized online at 500 Hz and stored to hard disk for later
analyses.
After data acquisition, EOG and EEG recordings were subjected to an
off-line ocular correction and artifact procedure performed with the
Vision Analyzer software (Version 1.04; BrainProducts GmbH, Munich,
Germany). Trials with responses of participants above 1000 ms were
discarded from all analyses. Blinks and eye movements were corrected
according to a method suggested by Gratton and others (1983). The
continuous EOG and EEG recordings were visually inspected with
a semiautomatic artifact rejection procedure, and each trial of the EEG
data with major artifacts was rejected for this and all other channels.
Then data were ﬁltered (pass band of 1--20 Hz) and baseline corrected.
For response-locked averages, the baseline was represented by the
average activity between 200 and 100 ms before the participant’s
response and, for stimulus-locked (or feedback locked) averages, the
average activity of the last 100 ms prestimulus (presentation of cards)
was used. Finally, EEG waveforms were averaged separately for each
participant, each experimental condition, and each electrode. For the
present report, the statistical analysis of EEG data will be restricted to
the following 5 channels: Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz all rereferenced to
linked earlobes. The restriction of the electrode set in the statistical
analyses was based on the hypothesis that a frontocentral midline
maximum was expected for the ERN. For a more detailed topographical
analysis, we used the brain electric source analysis (BESA) procedure
(Berg and Scherg 1994) including all 61 recorded channels. We analyzed
the ERN difference waveforms in a time window from zero to peak
according to the maxima of the ERN. A principal component analysis
was performed, and a ﬁrst dipole was adjusted using a single vertically
oriented starting position at the center of the head (see Gehring and
others 2000). Subsequently, a second dipole was included and adjusted
testing several different starting positions (see Miltner and others 1997).
Figure 1. Example of the stimulus material. The player reached a total score of 19 and rejected a fourth card. Because the opponent reached 21, the player lost (‘‘Verloren’’) 10
eurocent.
Figure 2. Time line of a single experimental trial/game. The events marked with * were used for analyses of event-related potentials.
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Results
Behavioral Data
Table 1 summarizes the empirical probabilities of participants
winning against the opponent when they stopped hitting at
scores between 11 and 21. As the table shows, participants were
more likely to win when they sat with high total scores (19/20/
21 scores) and more likely to lose when they sat with low total
scores (11--14).
The participants’ average decision-making behavior is pre-
sented in Figure 3. As indicated by the graph, the probability of
taking another card decreased as the player’s current total
points increased (11--21). The latter relation may be best
described by a logistic function. Logistic response patterns
have been described in detail by item response theory (see
Hambleton and Swaminathan 1985; Fischer and Molenaar 1995),
which suggests that the probability of a binary behavioral
response to a test item (in the present case: a hit or a stay) is
a logistic function of each participant’s ability to successfully
solve the test (in the present case, it may be termed degree of
risk-taking behavior) and the difﬁculty of the item (here: the
degree of risk when taking another card at each current score,
which—across each single game—increased from 11 to 21).
The behavioral data were analyzed according to models of item
response theory, which provide a parameter for the degree of
risk taking of each participant (indicating the score for which
the probability of accepting a hit or a stay was equal to 0.5). This
parameter may be termed risk threshold. In the present study, it
ranged from 14.61 to 17.01 (mean = 15.68, SD = 0.60). A
correlation analysis revealed that the risk-taking parameter was
highly predictive for the amount of money participants won.
The higher the risk threshold, the less money participants won
(r = –0.57, P = 0.013). Thus, unlike other gambling paradigms
used in ERN research, the reward was contingent upon
participant’s decision-making behavior.
ERP Data
First, stimulus-locked EEG averages to the feedback will be
presented to determine whether our data replicate previous
ﬁndings for gambling tasks. Subsequently, we test whether
feedback ERN amplitude is related to the probability of winning
given particular total scores (see Table 1). Next, the timing of
evaluative processes is analyzed in more detail by investigating
stimulus-locked ERPs following the presentation of the third
and fourth card before presentation of feedback. The question
here is whether the system already implicitly evaluates the
likely outcome of a trial (win or lose) before receiving ‘‘explicit’’
feedback about the results of the trial. Then we will determine
whether this evaluation is different when the risk of loss
following acceptance of an additional card is high rather than
low. In addition, we examine response-locked ERPs following
participants’ key presses that indicate acceptance of an addi-
tional card. This analysis reveals whether the implicit evaluative
process transfers to the postresponse period between partic-
ipants’ acceptance of a card (i.e., after conﬁrming a hit/stay by
a key press) and the explicit feedback about the outcome of his/
her decision.
Feedback
Do losses result in larger feedback ERNs than wins? The
stimulus-locked mean ERP waveforms at the 5 electrodes for
wins and losses and the corresponding difference wave (losses
minus wins) are presented in Figure 4a,b. Mean ERP amplitudes
between 300 and 350 ms following feedback for wins and losses
were calculated for each participant and electrode. An analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) of electrodes (all 5 electrodes) by
feedback (wins vs. losses) revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of
feedback, F1,17 = 5.19, P = 0.036. The amplitudes were more
negative (i.e., less positive) for losses than for wins (see Table 2)
with most negative amplitudes at electrode Fz. This result
replicates previous ﬁndings on feedback negativity in response
to monetary losses and implies increased ERN activity in
response to negative feedback.
Is loss-related ERN amplitude related to the probability of
winning as reﬂected in the ﬁnal score when participants stick?
For this analysis, the feedback ERN was quantiﬁed as the mean
amplitude between 300 and 350 ms of the difference wave of
losses minus wins at 3 levels of total score: ‘‘15/16,’’ ‘‘17/18,’’ and
‘‘19/20.’’ One participant had to be excluded from this analysis
because there were not enough trials in the ‘‘15/16’’ condition
due to the participant’s risky strategy. The ANOVA with factors
electrodes (5) and total score (15/16 vs. 17/18 vs. 19/20)
revealed a signiﬁcant main effect for total points, F2,32 = 3.32, P =
0.049. According to a signiﬁcant linear trend in a post hoc
contrast, F1,16 = 5.71, P = 0.029, the amplitudes with a maximum
at FCz became increasingly more negative from total score ‘‘15/
16’’ to total score ‘‘17/18’’ and total score ‘‘19/20’’ (i.e., highest
probability of reward; see Table 2). Figure 4c--e presents the
difference waveforms between losses and wins for all 3 levels of
total scores and depicts the topographic map for the score ‘‘19/
20.’’ The source analysis of the difference waveform revealed
a dipole in the medial frontal cortex for the feedback ERN to
scores of 19 and 20 (see Figs 7a and 4f). For the conditions with
lower scores (15/16 and 17/18), the dipole analysis did not
reveal a medial frontal dipole, which is likely due to the
markedly reduced ERN activity in these conditions.
It is important to note that there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the negativities in the stimulus-locked ERP to
winnings at 15/16, 17/18, and 19/20 (pairwise comparisons:
P values > 0.286). In addition, a further analysis of difference
Table 1
Empirical and mathematical probabilities of winning for different total points
Total points 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
p (win | sit) 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.33 0.31 0.54 0.52 0.78 0.85 1.00
p (win | hit) 0.50 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.13 0.00 0.00
p (win | hit þ sum\ 22) 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.72 0.88 0.93 1.00 0.00 0.00
Note: p(win | sit) denotes the empirical probability of winning given a sit decision for each score. All other values have been estimated mathematically using the latter empirical probabilities as a basis.
p (win | hit) denotes the probability of winning given a hit decision and given the strategy of stopping above 16 at decisions later in the trial. p (win | hit þ sum\ 22) denotes the conditional probability
of winning given that a hit decision at each score leads to a final score of below 22.
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waves (losses minus wins) revealed that the difference wave of
unexpected (improbable) losses (19/20) minus improbable
wins (15/16) was signiﬁcantly more negative than the differ-
ence wave of probable losses (15/16) minus probable wins (19/
20), F1,16 = 12.80, P = 0.003. The latter results imply that the
unexpectedness of an event in general does not trigger an ERN.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the greater the
reward expectation (probability of winning) the higher the
feedback ERN amplitude after a loss.
Responses to an Additional Card
Do ERPs reﬂect an implicit evaluation of the likely outcome of
a trial before feedback is presented? To address this question,
we examined the stimulus-locked ERPs following presentation
of the third and fourth card. We ﬁrst analyzed whether brain
electrical activities differed when participants’ total scores were
above 21 (a loss) as compared with conditions where partic-
ipants’ total scores stayed below 22 (good result). The re-
spective mean ERP waveforms at the 5 electrodes and the
difference wave between both conditions are presented in
Figure 5a,b. The mean amplitude was calculated for each
participant and each condition in a time window from 250 to
350 ms following the presentation of the third or fourth card.
The ANOVA of electrodes (5) by result (good vs. bad) revealed
a signiﬁcant interaction of electrodes by result, F4,68 = 14.37, P <
0.001, indicating that the amplitudes in response to the pre-
sentation of a card resulting in a score above 21 were relatively
more negative at frontal, frontocentral, and central electrodes
than to a card for which the total scores stayed below 22 points
(see Table 2 and Fig. 5b). This ﬁnding reveals that the feedback
ERN activity is already increased in response to an outcome that
indicates a subsequent loss.
Is this negativity affected by the amount of risk in taking the
third or fourth card? Here, the feedback ERN was quantiﬁed as
the mean amplitude between 250 and 350 ms of the difference
wave between losses and good results at 2 comparable (with
respect to the range of possible outcomes) levels of starting
scores: ‘‘13/14’’ (low risk) and ‘‘15/16’’ (medium risk). Figure
5c,d presents the difference waveforms. The ANOVA with
electrodes (5) and starting score (‘‘13/14’’ vs. ‘‘15/16’’) revealed
a signiﬁcant interaction of electrodes and starting score, F4,68 =
6.29, P = 0.011. The amplitudes with a maximum at FCz (see Fig.
5e for a topographic map for the level ‘‘15/16’’) were more
negative for losses following relatively more risky decisions (i.e.,
medium risk, ‘‘15/16,’’ see Table 2) than following relatively less
risky decisions (i.e., low risk, ‘‘13/14,’’ see Table 2). The source
analysis of the difference waveform revealed a dipole in the
medial frontal cortex for the medium-risk condition (see Fig.
7b). For the low-risk condition, the dipole analysis did not reveal
a medial frontal dipole, which is likely due to the markedly
reduced ERN activity in this condition. Thus, this result
indicates greater feedback ERN activity to an outcome in-
dicating a subsequent loss after more risky hit decisions.
Responses to Decision
In this section, we consider response-locked ERPs to partic-
ipants’ key presses indicating acceptance of a third or fourth
card (hit). According to the mean decision criterion of 15.68
(see Fig. 3), hit decisions above 16 were classiﬁed as high-risk
hit decisions, hit decisions of 16 as medium-risk, and hit
decisions under 16 as low-risk hit decisions. For this analysis,
2 participants had to be excluded because they did not show
enough trials with high-risk hit decisions (hits following scores
over 16). The ANOVA with the factors electrodes (5) by risk
level ( <16, =16, >16) of average ERP amplitudes within the
window of 50--100 ms post response revealed a signiﬁcant main
effect of risk level, F2,30 = 3.81, P = 0.034. Response-locked ERN
amplitudes after high-risk hit decisions were more negative
than ERP amplitudes in response to both medium- and low-risk
hit decisions, respectively (see Table 2). Figure 6a,b displays the
ERPs and difference waveforms for trials with high-risk hit
decisions minus trials with low- and medium-risk hit decisions.
This difference waveform reveals a clear negative peak after 85
ms with a frontocentral maximum (see Fig. 6c). The source
analysis of the difference waveform revealed a dipole in the
medial frontal cortex (see Fig. 7c). Thus, response-locked ERN
activity is increased after high-risk hit decisions, indicating that
the ERN process is sensitive to an early evaluation of such
decisions.
Interindividual Differences
Additional analyses addressed the relation between the risk
threshold of participants and ERN peak amplitude as revealed in
the difference waveforms. A ﬁrst analysis revealed no signiﬁcant
relation between difference amplitudes to subsequently drawn
cards or feedback and the risk threshold. A further analysis
revealed a signiﬁcant correlation between the risk threshold
and the response-locked ERN peak amplitude of the difference
wave (60 ms search window centered at 85 ms, average +/–10
ms) of hit decisions with 17 scores and higher minus hit
decisions with 16 scores and lower, r = 0.43, P < 0.05. Compared
with low-risk, cautious participants, high-risk participants
showed smaller response-locked ERN amplitudes to high-risk
hit decisions. Across the course of the experiment, cautious
participants tended to avoid high-risk hit decisions as compared
with participants with higher risk thresholds. This suggests
a direct relationship between the negative evaluation of certain
decisions as manifested in the ERN and the risk threshold (i.e.,
the decision-making behavior of participants). This is in line
with the idea that the ERNprocess is a signal of the negative eval-
uation of previous decisions, which then inﬂuences decision-
making behavior. Participants with larger response-locked ERN
Figure 3. Average decision-making behavior. The figure shows the response
characteristic averaged across all participants and decisions. The y axis represents
the mean probability of hit decisions (taking another card) across all participants and all
decisions at each current amount of points (x axis) with 2 and 3 cards.
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amplitudes in response to high-risk hit decisions tended to
avoid these decisions across the experiment.
A further correlation analysis between the number of trials in
the relevant high-risk hit condition, the risk threshold, and the
ERN amplitude made sure that the former effect was not due to
an effect of unexpectedness or rareness on the ERN. There was
no signiﬁcant correlation between the ERN amplitude and the
number of trials, (r = 0.29, P = 0.28). In addition—as may be
expected—there was a highly signiﬁcant correlation between
the risk threshold and the number of trials (r = 0.88). If the
variance of the risk threshold parameter had been eliminated
from the number of trials, then the relation between the
residual of the number of trials and ERN amplitude became
negative (–0.18), which corroborates the view that the ﬁnding
of a relationship between the ERN and risky behavior is not due
to unexpectedness or rareness.
Figure 4. (a) ERPs and (b) difference waveforms to the feedback (losses vs. wins). Difference waveforms to the feedback with different totals of (c) 19 and 20; (d) 17 and 18; (e)
15 and 16. (f) A topographic map of the peak of the difference waveform for losses versus wins with total scores of 19 and 20 (at 326 ms; spherical spline interpolation). Data for
frontal (Fz), frontocentral (FCz), central (Cz), centroparietal (CPz), and parietal (Pz) electrodes are presented.
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Subsequent analyses for behavioral changes revealed a signif-
icant relation between the behavioral change after a loss from
hit to sit decisions and the difference of the ERN amplitudes (r =
–0.57, P = 0.007) to bad outcomes after medium-risk hit
decisions (15/16) as compared with low-risk decisions (13/
14). Participants with relative greater ERN amplitudes to a bad
additional card (a bust) at medium risk as compared with low
risk showed a stronger tendency to change to more cautious
decisions. Furthermore, there were signiﬁcant correlations
between behavioral changes after a loss from sit to hit decisions
and feedback-related ERN amplitudes at ﬁnal feedback for the
difference wave at scores of 15/16 (r = –0.45, P = 0.034) and for
the difference wave at 17/18 (r = –0.53, P = 0.013). For scores of
19/20, the relation was not signiﬁcant (r = –0.17, P = 0.258).
Thus, participants exhibiting increased feedback-related ERN
amplitudes to losses with 15/16 and 17/18 showed a stronger
tendency to change to more risky decisions.
Discussion
The ERP results for the feedback about the outcome of the
present Seventeen and Four card game clearly replicate pre-
vious ﬁndings of gambling paradigms, namely, that the feedback
ERN amplitude to losses is greater than to wins (e.g., Gehring
and Willoughby 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, and others 2004;
Yasuda and others 2004; Yeung and Sanfey 2004). Furthermore,
the ERN difference wave to losses minus wins increased with
increasing total scores (from 15 and 16 over 17 and 18 to 19 and
20) indicating that the ERN increased with the degree to which
a loss was unexpected. This effect could not be attributed to the
unexpectedness of the event itself (cf., Holroyd 2004). Because
the expectation for a win also increases with the total score, the
present observations are in line with the proposal that the ERN
process may code a negative TD error during learning. In the
case of a loss, the current reward expectation drops to zero
when negative feedback is delivered. As a result, a situation that
leads to a greater reward expectation (e.g., a higher probability
of winning with 19/20, see Table 1) will have a different
outcomewhen negative feedback is delivered as compared with
a situation with a lower reward expectation (e.g., lower
probability to win with 15/16). There will be a larger decrease
in reward expectation and therefore a larger TD error.
Our data also suggest that an evaluation of reward expecta-
tion occurs not only at the time of feedback, but is also present
when participants receive outcome relevant information (in the
form of a third or fourth card). A ‘‘bad next card’’ elicits more
negative ERP amplitudes than a ‘‘good next card.’’ The analysis of
the ERPs averaged to decision-making responses further sug-
gests that evaluative processes take place even before partic-
ipants receive such outcome relevant information. The results
revealed increased response-locked ERN amplitudes to high-
risk hit decisions above 16. This indicates that evaluative
processes are already ongoing even as decisions are being
made and that high-risk hit decisions are evaluated immediately.
Because a hit decision above 16 strongly decreases the
probability of winning as compared with a sit decision, an
associated decrease in reward expectation (e.g., of about
20% for 17, see difference of sit versus hit in Table 1) would
constitute a negative TD error. In addition, participants with
larger response-locked ERN amplitudes to high-risk hit deci-
sions tended to play more cautiously and thus to avoid high-risk
hit decisions across the experiment.
The relation between ERN amplitude and decision making
may be compared with recent ﬁndings in similar studies
(Yasuda and others 2004; Yeung and Sanfey 2004). Our ﬁndings
show that high-risk hit decisions above 16 lead to a relatively
large response-locked ERN compared with hit decisions below
16 and that the amplitude of this response-locked ERN is related
to more cautious decisions across the experiment. In contrast,
Yeung and Sanfey (2004) reported on an increased likelihood
of risky decisions subsequent to greater stimulus-locked ERN
activity in preceding trials (similar to Yasuda and others 2004).
This divergence may be due to the fact that feedback was
contingent upon behavior in our study, whereas this was not the
case in the Yeung and Sanfey (2004) study where the feedback
was not informative for the participant with respect to a future
decision. In particular, in the latter study, feedback was given
pseudorandomly, and the participants won on 50% of the trials.
Thus, a participant with increased subjective reward expecta-
tion (and according to RL theory with increased ERN to a loss)
may be more likely to follow the gambler’s fallacy and make
more risky decisions because these decisions have a higher
subjective outcome. Moreover, these risky decisions do not lead
Table 2
Mean amplitudes, SD, and BESA coordinates for different time periods and experimental conditions
Region Period and condition
Feedback Additional card Decision
Kind of feedback Points with additional card Difference before card Points before hit decision
Win Loss Difference [21 \22 15/16 13/14 [16 516 \16
Total points
19/20 17/18 15/16
Fz 2.65 4.21 3.08 1.67 0.63 1.06 2.73 3.03 1.37 2.20 0.38 0.20
0.93 0.94 0.95 0.70 0.72 0.47 0.63 0.98 0.47 0.68 0.70 0.56
FCz 3.84 5.20 3.39 1.63 0.69 0.22 1.74 3.28 1.26 3.53 0.62 0.55
1.21 1.15 1.08 0.82 0.82 0.55 0.75 1.20 0.64 0.83 0.93 0.70
Cz 4.59 5.60 3.12 1.36 0.29 0.13 0.94 2.05 0.80 3.51 0.57 0.81
1.19 1.10 1.17 0.80 0.99 0.64 0.83 1.17 0.65 0.87 1.07 0.79
CPz 4.65 5.62 3.26 1.22 0.47 0.13 0.07 0.56 0.33 3.20 0.53 1.16
1.13 1.05 1.27 0.78 1.14 0.69 0.92 1.23 0.59 0.85 1.17 0.85
Pz 4.67 5.76 3.41 1.27 0.71 0.88 1.33 0.62 0.05 3.18 0.84 1.62
1.10 1.04 1.24 0.74 1.12 0.73 0.88 1.32 0.60 0.97 1.17 0.91
Note: Mean (above) and SD (below) for frontal (Fz), frontaocentral (FCz), central (Cz), centroparietal (CPz), and parietal (Pz) positions.
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to systematic adverse consequences under pseudorandomized
feedback. In contrast, in the present study, highly risky behavior
lead to systematic negative consequences—in particular to
a decrease in reward (r = –0.57)—and thus shaped behavior
toward more cautious decisions. On the other hand, the
feedback-locked and the response-locked ERN may be different
phenomena (see also Gehring and Willoughby 2004), which
may be an alternative explanation for the divergent results
because our ﬁnding is based on response-locked ERN data and
the ﬁnding by Yeung and Sanfey (2004) on feedback-locked
ERN data.
Taken together, the above ﬁndings are in line with the
suggestion that the ERN process is involved in RL, a process
that is sensitive to the negative deviation from a reward
Figure 5. (a) ERPs and (b) difference waveforms to subsequently drawn cards at total scores over 21 versus total scores below 22. Difference waveform to the subsequent card at
total scores over 21 minus total scores below 22 for different starting scores (c) 15 and 16; (d) 13 and 14. (e) A topographic map (at 294 ms; spherical spline interpolation) of the
peak of the difference waveform for final scores over 21 minus final scores below 22 for medium-risk situations (starting scores of 15/16). Data for frontal (Fz), frontocentral (FCz),
central (Cz), centroparietal (CPz), and parietal (Pz) electrodes are presented.
872 ERN and Blackjack d Hewig and others
expectation in response to errors, feedback, and monetary
losses (e.g., Holroyd and Coles 2002; Holroyd and others 2002;
Holroyd and others 2003; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, and others
2004). The above results further suggest that the ERN may be
considered as a signature of the negative evaluation of an action
or decision and may thus facilitate the avoidance of such actions
or decisions in the future (for a similar ﬁnding, see Frank and
others 2005).
However, a more detailed analysis of the ERPs to the
presentation of a third or fourth card revealed that feedback-
related ERN difference waves for total scores over 21 minus
total scores below 22 for 2 levels of risk (low with 13 and 14 and
medium with 15 and 16) were greater for bad outcomes after
preceding medium-risk hit decisions as compared with low-risk
hit decisions. This particular ﬁnding appears to contradict the
RL theory because according to a mathematical estimate, the
reward expectation for low-risk is 33% versus 25% for medium-
risk hit decisions (see Table 1). Accordingly, the difference in
reward expectation for a hit at 13/14 as compared with a hit at
15/16 is rather small and inverse to the TD hypothesis. Thus, an
explanation solely based on the degree of reward expectation
or the TD error seems to be insufﬁcient.
One approach to explain the latter ﬁnding is to propose that
the participants chose to hit with the intention (expectation) to
stay below 22 with the additional card. On average, this
intended result (staying below 22) is associated with higher
reward expectation for medium-risk (67%, see Table 1) as
compared with low-risk hit decisions (58%). Accordingly, the
Figure 6. (a) ERPs and (b) difference waveforms for hit decisions at scores over 16 minus hit decisions at scores under 17. (c) A topographic map of the peak of the difference
waveform for hit decisions with scores over 16 minus hit decisions with scores under 17 (at 84 ms; spherical spline interpolation). Data for frontal (Fz), frontocentral (FCz), central
(Cz), centroparietal (CPz), and parietal (Pz) electrodes are presented.
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ERN to the additional card might reﬂect the TD error related to
the decrease in the reward expectation that is based on the
intention/goal of the participant. Thus, the deviation of an
outcome from an intention would trigger the ERN, and the ERN
amplitude would be proportional to the reward expectation
associated with that intention. This interpretation suggests that
the brain calculates a conditional probability of reward based on
its intentions (calculating the probability of winning if staying
below 22). The latter idea of an evaluation of an intended
reward expectation by the ERN process is consistent with the
proposal of Paus (2001), who suggested that the anterior
cingulate participates in the translation of intentions into
actions. Because the ACC has connections to brain areas
responsible for drive and arousal, for motor output, and for
cognition, it is in an ideal position to perform this translation
(see Paus 2001). More speciﬁcally, the negative evaluation of an
intended reward expectation may reduce the probability that
the respective intention obtains access to action. RL theory is
based on this functional view of the ACC (see Holroyd and Coles
2002). However, the idea that the ACC deals with reward
expectation based on an intention deviates from the original RL
model, which proposed that the ERN represents the computa-
tion of a more general TD error based on the subjective reward
expectation of the current situation.
In terms of RL theory, an intention most closely resembles an
action policy, which may be considered as a plan of action or
Figure 7. The localization and orientation of the dipoles, the goodness of fit parameter, the residual variance, and the dipole moments are shown for (a) a loss with 19 and 20 (ERN:
dipole 2; x –5.8; y 23.9; z 15.1; residual variance at 326 ms: 9.91%), (b) a bad outcome after a medium-risk hit decision (ERN: dipole 1; x –3.1; y –12.7; z: 30.8; residual variance at
294 ms: 15.03%), and (c) a high-risk hit decision (ERN: dipole 1; x 1.9; y 25.3; z 15.3; residual variance at 84 ms: 9.92%). All other conditions of each ERN difference wave analysis
provided no support for a medial frontal source, which was likely due to the markedly reduced ERN activity in these conditions.
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more generally a plan of events (if in situation S use action A that
leads to situation S9). The intentional view suggests that the
focus of evaluation is the action policy rather than the average
reward expectation of the current situation. Accordingly, the
success of one’s action policy is being evaluated and, if an
intention/action policy fails, an ERN is elicited rather than if
a reduction in current reward expectation is detected. In most
cases, the 2 accounts may yield the same predictions because
any action policy/intention is associated with a certain reward
expectation. However, in certain cases, they may yield different
predictions. For example, an action A is taken in order to lead to
a situation S, but an opponent player causes that the action leads
to situation S9. If the same reward expectation were associated
with situations S and S9, the intentional view would suggest that
the deviation from the intention or action policy is sufﬁcient to
elicit an ERN although reward expectation does not change. In
contrast, the TD error view would not expect an ERN in such
a situation. Thus, future research is needed to clarify whether
a deviation from an intention is a sufﬁcient, or a necessary
condition for the elicitation of an ERN, or neither of these
2 alternatives.
The proposed view that a deviation of an outcome from an
intention triggers the ERN would also imply a different expla-
nation for some of the other ﬁndings of the present study. For
example, the response-locked ERN to the hit decisions may be
interpreted as a deviation from the intention of the participants
not to hit above a certain score. Accordingly, the response-
locked ERN to high-risk hits (as opposed to medium and low
risk) may reﬂect the deviation from the policy of the partic-
ipants not to hit above 16 because the high-risk hits are clearly
beyond the risk threshold (mean = 15.68, SD = 0.60). This
implies that the observed response-locked ERN would be the
consequence of an ‘‘erroneous’’ decision or response. For the
feedback-locked ERN following ﬁnal feedback, the interpreta-
tion is rather similar to the initial TD error explanation. The
reward expectation associated with the intention to win should
be similar to the current reward expectation just before
feedback. This intentional interpretation clearly deviates from
the original RL theory of the ERN. While both share the idea that
the amplitude of the ERN is proportional to the degree of
a reward expectation, the intentional explanation proposes that
a participant’s unaccomplished intention or action policy
triggers ERN.
Another interpretation might reconcile the above ﬁndings
more directly with the RL theory of the ERN. According to
Holroyd and Coles (2002), the ERN amplitude is proportional to
the TD error multiplied by the eligibility trace. The eligibility
trace is a parameter in learning theory and indicates that
a population of neurons remains eligible for learning leading
to behavioral change. Accordingly, it may be hypothesized that
the eligibility trace parameter is greater after hit decisions with
medium risk (of 15 and 16) as compared with low risk (13 and
14), whereas the difference in reward expectation is probably
small. This hypothesis is corroborated by the observation that
the average number of behavioral changes per participant (i.e.,
the number of changes from a hit to a sit decision and vice versa,
reﬂecting an openness for learning) is 23.7 (SD = 6.3) for
medium-risk trials (15 and 16) and only about 6.4 (SD = 6.1) for
low-risk trials (13 and 14). Thus, greater behavioral change,
which may reﬂect more openness to learning, is accompanied
by greater ERN amplitudes in the medium-risk condition.
Furthermore, a correlational analysis of interindividual differ-
ences examined whether speciﬁc relevant behavioral changes
are related to the differences in the ERN waves between these
conditions. There was a signiﬁcant relationship between the
behavioral change after a loss with a hit decision to a sit decision
and the difference of the ERN amplitudes (r = –0.57, P = 0.007).
Thus, participants who showed greater behavioral changes also
showed a greater increase in the ERN amplitudes to bad
outcomes after medium-risk hit decisions as compared with
low-risk decisions. Another ﬁnding further corroborates the
idea that increased ERN amplitudes might be associated with
greater behavioral changes or an increased eligibility of neurons
for learning. There were signiﬁcant correlations between the
relevant behavioral changes from sit to hit after losses with a sit
decisions and the feedback-related ERN amplitudes for the
difference wave at 15/16 (r = –0.45, P = 0.034) and for the
difference wave at 17/18 (r = –0.53, P = 0.013, and not signiﬁcant
for 19/20, r = –0.17, P = 0.258). This ﬁnding reveals an
association between increased feedback-related ERN ampli-
tudes and stronger behavioral shifts. Because the ERN ampli-
tudes are supposed to be proportional to both the eligibility
trace and the TD error (or reward expectation), it may be
argued that the differences between the 3 conditions of ﬁnal
scores are mainly due to differences in reward expectation,
whereas the differences between participants reveal that the
ERN may also be ampliﬁed by the eligibility trace. In particular,
this is primarily the case for lower scores because behavioral
changes for higher scores (19/20) were rarely observed.
Taken together, most of the ﬁndings of the present study are
in line with RL theory of the ERN (e.g., Holroyd and Coles
2002; Holroyd and others 2002; Holroyd and others 2003;
Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, and others 2004). First, we found gre-
ater feedback ERN activty to losses as compared with wins.
Second, this increase of feedback ERN activity was shown to be
linearly related to the degree of reward expectation. Third,
greater ERN activity was found for busts as compared with good
outcomes for subsequent cards. Fourth, response-locked ERN
was reported for high-risk hits, which is in line with an
expected TD error for such hits, and ﬁfth, the amplitude of
the response-locked ERN was signiﬁcantly related to more
cautious behavior. However, one particular ﬁnding contradicts
the proposal that the TD error is exclusively related to ERN
amplitude. The feedback ERN was greater for bad outcomes
after preceding medium-risk hit decisions as compared with
low-risk hit decisions, which suggests that the RL theory may
have to be amended. Two possibilities of revising RL theory of
the ERN have been suggested in the present manuscript. First,
the intention of the participant may be the key to the un-
derstanding of the ERN phenomena presented here. Accord-
ingly, the ERN amplitude would be proportional to the reward
expectation associated with the ‘‘unfulﬁlled’’ intention of the
participant. Alternatively, the relevance for learning and future
behavior may be a critical variable and may be implemented in
the form of an eligibility trace parameter. Accordingly, ERN
amplitudes are proposed to be proportional to reward expec-
tation and to the degree of openness to learning of populations
of neurons involved in the task.
In summary, our data indicate that both internal and external
information is used to evaluate behavior in terms of its success
or failure, and failure may lead to the avoidance of behaviors that
precede it. Furthermore, the present data imply that decision
making in a more complex game such as Blackjack might
involve additional cognitive variables and the evaluation of
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several different kinds of reward expectation. Further research
is necessary to explore this possibility. Recent studies have
provided a mixed pattern of results regarding a TD error
explanation of ERN ﬁndings (e.g., Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, and
others 2003; Hajcak, Holroyd, and others 2005; Hajcak, Moser,
and others 2005; Holroyd and others 2006). Additional research
will be necessary to examine the relations between different
theoretical accounts of ERN phenomena (Holroyd and Coles
2002; Luu and others 2003; Yeung and others 2004), which
might provide a more ﬁnal assessment of the explanatory power
of RL theory for ERN phenomena. In particular, the relation
between behavioral change and ERN amplitude and the relation
between intention and reward expectation in RL theory need
further elaboration. Finally, our analysis of the behavior of the
ERN in a realistic gambling paradigm suggests an avenue for the
investigation of pathologic gambling and may further corrobo-
rate the role of dopamine in such behaviors (Comings and
others 1996, 1999; Hollander and others 2000) because
dopamine has been proposed to play an important role in the
generation of the ERN (e.g., Holroyd and Coles 2002).
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